	Case 3:17-cv-03511-WHO Documen	t 41 Filed 08/21/17 Page 1 of 20	
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	BRADLEY S. PHILLIPS (State Bar No. 085 SETH J. FORTIN (State Bar No. 302790) MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 355 South Grand Avenue, 35 th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071-1560 Telephone: (213) 683-9100 Facsimile: (213) 687-3702 ADELE M. EL-KHOURI (<i>Pro hac vice</i> pend MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 1155 F Street, NW, 7th Floor Washington, D.C. 20004 Telephone: (202) 220-1100 Facsimile: (202) 220-2300		
10	Attorneys for Defendants BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFO STATE UNIVERSITY, SAN FRANCISCO		
11	UNIVERSITY; LESLIE WONG; MARY AN BEGLEY; LUOLUO HONG; LAWRENCE	NN	
12	BIRELLO; REGINALD PARSON; OSVALDO DEL VALLE; KENNETH MONTEIRO; BRIAN STUART; ROBERT NAVA; MARK JARAMILLA; VERNON PICCINOTTI; AND SHIMINA HARRIS		
13 14			
14	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
16	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
17			
18	JACOB MANDEL, et al.	CASE NO. CV 3:17-cv-03511-WHO	
19	Plaintiffs,	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE	
20	VS.	COMPLAINT	
21	BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY,	Judge:Hon. William H. Orrick IIIDept:Courtroom 2, 17th Floor	
22	SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.,	Date:November 8, 2017Time:2:00 p.m.	
23 24	Defendants.		
24			
26			
20			
28			
		CASE NO. 3:17-CV-03511-WHO	
	DEFENDANTS' NOTIC	E OF MOT. AND MOT. TO STRIKE	

	Cas	e 3:17·	-cv-03511-WHO Document 41 Filed 08/21/17 Page 2 of 20	
1			TABLE OF CONTENTS	age
3	NOTIC	CE OF N	MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE	U
4	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 1			
5	I. INTRODUCTION 1		1	
6	II. LEGAL STANDARD: THE COURT'S POWER TO STRIKE		2	
7	III. THE COMPLAINT IS CONFUSING, OPAQUE, AND POORLY ORGANIZED, AND SHOULD BE STRICKEN IN ITS ENTIRETY		3	
8 9	IV. LARGE QUANTITIES OF REDUNDANT, IMMATERIAL, IMPERTINENT, AND SCANDALOUS MATERIAL SHOULD BE STRICKEN FROM THE			
10		A.	PLAINT The Complaint is disorganized and full of redundancies	
11 12		A. B.	Large sections of the Complaint are legal conclusions or irrelevant legal argumentation.	
12		C.	Incidents of anti-Semitism on other campuses are irrelevant.	
14		D.	Historical incidents from decades ago are irrelevant and a scandalous	
15	attempt to invoke guilt by association			
16		E.	The State Department definition of anti-Semitism is irrelevant.	
17		F.	Allegations about anti-Semitic campus speech are irrelevant	
18		G.	Allegations of threats against Israeli soldiers are irrelevant	9
19		H.	The characterization of Defendant Wong's statement as invoking anti- Semitic stereotypes is unsupported on its face and deliberately scandalous	9
20		I.	Allegations regarding Defendant Abdulhadi	. 11
21		J.	Mr. Stuart, Mr. Piccinotti, and Ms. Harris as Defendants	. 13
22		K.	In the alternative, Defendants move for a more definite statement as to Defendants Abdulhadi, Stuart, Piccinotti, and Harris	. 14
23	V. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF			
24				
25				
26				
27				
28				
			-i- CASE NO. 3:17-CV-03511 DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF MOT. AND MOT. TO STRIKE	-WHO

	Case 3:17-cv-03511-WHO Document 41 Filed 08/21/17 Page 3 of 20		
1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES		
2	Page		
3	FEDERAL CASES		
4	843 F 2d 613 (1st Cir. 1988)		
5	Alward v. Burrelle's Info. Servs.,		
6	No. CV-00-365-PHX-ROS, 2001 WL 1708779 (D. Ariz. Dec. 5, 2001)		
7 8	In re Campora,		
9	<i>Conklin v. Anthou</i> ,		
10	No. 1:10-CV-02501, 2011 WL 1303299 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2011)		
11	<i>Doe v. W. Am. Province of Capuchin Franciscan Friars</i> , No. 2:14-CV-01428-HZ, 2015 WL 5522016 (D. Or. Sept. 17, 2015)		
12	<i>Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty,</i>		
13	984 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993), <i>rev'd on other grounds</i> , 510 U.S. 517 (1994)2, 7		
14	<i>Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist.</i> , 804 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2015)		
15	Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer,		
16	425 F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 2005)10		
17	<i>Grayson v. Schriro,</i>		
18	No. CIV-05-1749 PHX RCB, 2007 WL 91611 (D. Ariz. Jan. 11, 2007)		
19	Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co.,		
20	758 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1985)4		
20	Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep't, 530 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2008)		
22	In re Johnson,		
23	236 B.R. 510 (D.D.C. 1999)		
24	<i>McHenry v. Renne</i> , 84 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1996)2, 3, 4		
25	Micromed Tech., Inc. v. Birdsall,		
26	No. CIV 13-586-TUC-CKJ, 2014 WL 129049 (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 2014)		
27	Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc.,		
28	435 U.S. 589 (1978)10		
	-i- CASE NO. 3:17-CV-03511-WHO DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF MOT. AND MOT. TO STRIKE		

	Case 3:17-cv-03511-WHO Document 41 Filed 08/21/17 Page 4 of 20	
1 2	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page	
3 4	<i>Pigford v. Veneman</i> , 215 F.R.D. 2 (D.D.C. 2003)10, 11	
5 6	<i>Quatela v. Stryker Corp.</i> , 820 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2010)	
7	Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1983)	
8 9	Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1992)11	
10 11	FEDERAL STATUTES 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)	
12	FEDERAL RULES Fed. R. Civ. P. 8	
13 14	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e)	
15 16	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)	
17	H.R.6421, Anti-Semitism Awareness Act of 20168	
18 19	OTHER AUTHORITIES CNN.com, Fact Check: Is Obama 'palling around with terrorists'? (Oct. 5, 2008)	
20 21	Cohen, Debra Nussbaum, Anti-Zionist Hasidic Jews Shake the Room at Brooklyn's Barclays Center, Haaretz (Jun 12, 2017), http://www.haaretz.com/us- news/.premium-1.795270	
22 23	Ross, Janell, <i>Why aren't we calling the Oregon occupiers 'terrorists'?</i> , Washington Post (Jan. 3, 2016)	
24 25	Stern, Kenneth, Letter to Members of Congress (Dec. 6, 2016), <i>available at</i> http://jkrfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Letter-to-members-of- congress.pdf	
26 27 28	Terkel, Amanda, <i>Donald Trump Floats Conspiracy Theory That Huma Abedin Has</i> <i>Terrorist Ties</i> , Huffington Post (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-huma- abedin_us_57c4aaafe4b09cd22d92273c13	
	-ii- CASE NO. 3:17-CV-03511-WHO DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF MOT. AND MOT. TO STRIKE	

	Case 3:17-cv-03511-WHO Document 41 Filed 08/21/17 Page 5 of 20	
1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)	
2	Page	
3	Terry, Josh, <i>Let's laugh at this blogger who called Beyoncé an 'urban terrorist'</i> , Chicago Tribune (Apr. 25, 2016),	
4	http://www.chicagotribune.com/redeye/redeye-beyonce-lemonade-drudge-role-	
5	model-urban-terrorist-20160425-story.html	
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
	-iii- CASE NO. 3:17-CV-03511-WHO DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF MOT. AND MOT. TO STRIKE	

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on November 8, 2017 at 2:00 p.m., in the 3 Courtroom of the Honorable William H. Orrick III, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, defendants Board of Trustees of the California State University, Leslie Wong, Mary 4 5 Ann Begley, Luoluo Hong, Lawrence Birello, Reginald Parson, Osvaldo Del Valle, Kenneth Monteiro, Brian Stuart, Robert Nava, Mark Jaramilla, Vernon Piccinotti, and Shimina Harris 6 7 (collectively, "Defendants") will and hereby do move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 12(f) to strike redundant, immaterial, impertinent, and scandalous portions of the Complaint. The 9 motion is based on this notice, the memorandum of points and authorities that follows, all 10 pleadings and papers filed herein, oral argument of counsel, and any other matter which may be submitted at the hearing. 11

12

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

13 I. INTRODUCTION

14 Plaintiffs' Complaint, weighing in at a gravitationally significant 72 pages and 15 comprising over 235 paragraphs, is bloated with irrelevancies, redundancies, groundless personal 16 attacks, and legal conclusions-to the point that the legal claims themselves are obscure and hard 17 to understand. Defendants are entitled to a "short and plain statement of the claim[s]," Fed. R. 18 Civ. P. $\delta(a)(2)$, so that they may formulate an answer and so that all parties (including the Court) 19 "avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by 20 dispensing with those issues prior to trial." Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 21 (9th Cir. 1983). Plaintiffs' allegations are neither short nor plain and, "[r]ather than set out the basis for a lawsuit, the pleading seems designed to provide quotations for newspaper stories." 22 23 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996). To the extent that the Court declines to 24 dismiss the Complaint altogether (see Motion to Dismiss filed herewith), Defendants respectfully 25 request that the Court strike certain portions of the Complaint, so that Defendants and the Court 26 may get down to the business of addressing the merits of Plaintiffs' actual claims.

- 27
- 28

II.

LEGAL STANDARD: THE COURT'S POWER TO STRIKE

2 Rule 12(f) provides that "[t]he court may strike from a pleading . . . any redundant,
3 immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter."

"Immaterial' matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the
claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded. 'Impertinent' matter consists of statements that do
not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question. Superfluous historical allegations are a
proper subject of a motion to strike." *Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty*, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir.
1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), *rev'd on other grounds*, 510 U.S. 517
(1994).

10 "Scandalous matters are allegations that unnecessarily reflect on the moral character of an individual or states anything in repulsive language that detracts from the dignity of 11 12 the court." Quatela v. Stryker Corp., 820 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citations and 13 internal quotation marks omitted). A court may strike as scandalous "defamatory material," Alward v. Burrelle's Info. Servs., No. CV-00-365-PHX-ROS, 2001 WL 1708779, at *9 (D. Ariz. 14 Dec. 5, 2001); "statements that amount to name-calling and are argumentative or disrespectful," 15 Micromed Tech., Inc. v. Birdsall, No. CIV 13-586-TUC-CKJ, 2014 WL 129049, at *3 (D. Ariz. 16 Jan. 3, 2014); and derogatory allegations with "no apparent basis," In re Campora, No. 14-CV-17 18 5066 JFB, 2015 WL 5178823, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2015), whose "only effect" is to 19 "embarrass Defendants." Doe v. W. Am. Province of Capuchin Franciscan Friars, No. 2:14-CV-20 01428-HZ, 2015 WL 5522016, at *6 (D. Or. Sept. 17, 2015). "Rule 12(f) protects parties from the 21 improper use of judicial filings to broadcast scandalous or defamatory material." Id. 22 A district court has "ample remedial authority to relieve a defendant of the burden 23 of responding to a complaint with excessive factual detail." Hearns v. San Bernardino Police 24 Dep't, 530 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008). This includes the authority to strike large portions of 25 the complaint if they are mere "surplusage." Id. (stating that the district court could strike 38 26 *pages* of surplus allegations from the complaint). 27

III. <u>THE COMPLAINT IS CONFUSING, OPAQUE, AND POORLY ORGANIZED,</u> <u>AND SHOULD BE STRICKEN IN ITS ENTIRETY</u>

3 Rule 8(a)(2) requires a pleading party to set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "When a complaint fails to comply with 4 5 the requirements of Rule 8(a), the district court has the power, on motion or sua sponte, to dismiss 6 the complaint or to strike those parts of the complaint that are redundant or immaterial." Grayson 7 v. Schriro, No. CIV-05-1749 PHX RCB, 2007 WL 91611, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 11, 2007). While it 8 may be possible in some cases to strike just portions of the complaint, in other cases the pleading 9 may be "so saturated with redundant, immaterial, impertinent, and scandalous matter so as to 10 make precise surgery to excise the offending portions virtually impossible." Conklin v. Anthou, 11 No. 1:10-CV-02501, 2011 WL 1303299, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2011). In such cases, the Court 12 may strike or dismiss the entire complaint and require a pleading that conforms to Rule 8. *Id.* 13 (striking complaint); McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1176–78 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal). 14

15 As will be explained further below, and as in *McHenry*, the Complaint is 16 "argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant. It consists largely of 17 immaterial background information" Id. at 1177. As in Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., the 18 Complaint "exceed[s] 70 pages in length" and is "confusing and conclusory." 758 F.2d 409, 415 19 (9th Cir. 1985). The large quantities of material unmoored from any claim, the sections spent 20recapitulating irrelevant history and/or other parts of the Complaint, legal argument disguised as 21 allegations of fact, and unsupportable attempts to smear several defendants all add up to a 22 Complaint that is nearly impossible to answer. It should be stricken in its entirety, and the Court 23 should require Plaintiffs to comply with Rule 8 by filing a short, plain statement of their alleged 24 claims, shorn of the immaterial, repetitive, and confusing airing of grievances that bloats the 25 current Complaint. 26

1

- 27
- 28

IV. <u>LARGE QUANTITIES OF REDUNDANT, IMMATERIAL, IMPERTINENT, AND</u> <u>SCANDALOUS MATERIAL SHOULD BE STRICKEN FROM THE COMPLAINT</u>

The Complaint is redundant and confusing, needlessly treading the same ground over again. It is also packed with immaterial and impertinent allegations. This places an extraordinary and unwarranted burden on Defendants in responding to the claims and on the Court in refereeing them. Additionally, several of the allegations are inflammatory and needlessly cast aspersions on the character of certain defendants and should be stricken as scandalous as well as immaterial and impertinent.

9

1

2

A. <u>The Complaint is disorganized and full of redundancies.</u>

10 Rather than making a plain, short statement of their case, Plaintiffs fill pages with
11 either repeated boilerplate or multiple sets of allegations that appear to be duplicative.

12 For example, Defendants take four pages to identify the parties, because each 13 Plaintiff is described in needlessly repetitive boilerplate. (Compare Compl. ¶ 22 ("due to the intentional exclusion of Hillel from the 'Know Your Rights' Fair, Mr. Mandel was denied the 14 15 opportunity to equally participate in and benefit from that event Mr. Mandel has been 16 verbally and physically threatened and targeted on SFSU's campus based on his Jewish identity, and has personally experienced the University's intentional discrimination and deliberate 17 18 indifference to SFSU's pervasively hostile anti-Jewish environment. These experiences have 19 caused Mr. Mandel to miss class at SFSU and have deprived Mr. Mandel of equal access to the 20 educational opportunities or benefits provided by SFSU and CSU to similarly situated students 21 who are non-Jewish or who choose to not be open about their Jewish identity"), with ¶¶ 23-24 (virtually identical language); compare ¶ 25 ("Plaintiff Masha Merkulova is a Jewish member of 22 23 the community who came to SFSU with her son on April 6, 2016 to hear Mayor Barkat's speech. 24 Like the other attendees, she was deprived of the right to hear Mayor Barkat's speech or otherwise 25 meaningfully participate in the event and express her views. She was among the group of 26 attendees verbally and physically threatened by the disruptive individuals at the event."), with ¶¶ 27 26-27 (identical language).)

Plaintiffs also needlessly spend over five pages on a "Summary of the Action"
 that—to the extent that it is not argumentative or irrelevant, *see* Parts IV.B-G, *infra*—is largely
 redundant with later sections of the Complaint. (*Compare, e.g., id.* at ¶¶ 5-9 (describing the
 Mayor Barkat speech), *with* ¶¶ 61-78 (same).)

5 At the same time, these redundancies are not simply grouped together in a way that would make them easy to respond to. Rather, they are sprinkled throughout the Complaint in a 6 7 way that makes it unclear how Defendants should respond, or what causes of action certain 8 allegations are pertinent to. For example, allegations of a supposedly anti-Semitic environment at 9 SFSU are spread across at least six sections of the complaint and mixed in with irrelevancies, such 10 as conditions on other college campuses or historical events from decades ago. (*Compare id.* at 1 (section titled "Exponential Rise in Anti-Semitism"), with id. at 1-2 ("San Francisco State 11 12 University"), id. at 4-6 ("SFSU's Environment of Pervasive Racial Discrimination"), id. at 11-16 13 ("SFSU's Egregious History of Virulent Anti-Semitism and Civil Rights Violations"), id. at 40 14 ("Defendants' Selective Protection of Free Speech Discriminates Against Jews"), and id. at 59-61 ("Despite Repeated Promises and Declarations, SFSU Has Failed to Cure these Systemic 15 Problems").) 16

These sections tell and re-tell the same narratives with slightly different details.
(*See, e.g.*, Compl. ¶¶ 119, 122 (telling different parts of the Omar Barghouti story); *id.* at ¶¶ 80,
(*See, e.g.*, Compl. ¶¶ 119, 122 (telling different parts of the Omar Barghouti story); *id.* at ¶¶ 80,
(*see, e.g.*, Compl. ¶¶ 119, 122 (telling different parts of the Number strike story); *id.* at ¶¶ 47, 119 (giving different details
about a speech by "Khalid Abdul Muhammad" and "Khalid Muhammad"—apparently, though not
certainly, the same person).) To answer the Complaint, Defendants would be forced to unravel
these varying strands and attempt to re-weave them into a coherent narrative.

Moreover, despite the surfeit of historical detail, the Complaint is extremely vague
about which details constitute the factual grounding for each of its claims. For example, which of
the six or more sections detailing alleged anti-Semitism map to the claim that "Plaintiffs Mandel,
Volk and Kern have been subjected to discrimination by SFSU and CSU based on their Jewish
ancestry and religion"? (*Id.* at ¶ 220.) It is impossible to say from this Complaint.

B.

<u>Large sections of the Complaint are legal conclusions or irrelevant legal</u> <u>argumentation.</u>

3 Much of the Complaint cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered factual allegation. Rather, it contains page after page of conclusory legal argument—or simple 4 5 grandstanding. The Complaint features, for example, unnecessary references to a non-specific "dangerous assault on First Amendment rights on college campuses by administrators and officials 6 7 who support the suppression of free speech"; the opinions of an attorney unconnected to this case 8 about campus speech generally; generic descriptions of what "[u]niversities should be," and 9 unsourced summaries of what "courts have ruled." And that is just in the "Summary of the 10 Action." (Compl. ¶¶ 10-11.)

Plaintiffs also spend numerous pages conclusorily asserting violations of various
campus codes and state criminal laws, notwithstanding that this Court is neither a school honor
board nor a state criminal court, and the protestors are not defendants here. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 79-80,
including subparagraphs.) Such legal assertions are at best tangential to the claims at issue, and,
more importantly, Defendants have no way of answering them without themselves engaging in
substantial legal argumentation in the responsive pleading.

The Complaint also thinly disguises legal argumentation and conclusions as the
thoughts of a Plaintiff: "He felt overcome by the devastating realization that the administration
would continue to deny the basic civil rights of the audience, just as they had always refused to
treat Jews equally on campus." (*Id.* at ¶ 82.) "Mr. Volk . . . sens[ed] that the disruptors wished to
conceal their identities to avoid the consequences of their unlawful activity." (*Id.* at ¶ 83.)

22

C. Incidents of anti-Semitism on other campuses are irrelevant.

Plaintiffs devote a third of a page to alleging an "exponential rise" in anti-Semitic
incidents on campuses nationwide. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Whether true or not, these allegations cannot
have any effect on the claims or defenses in this case and should be stricken. *Fantasy, Inc.*, 984
F.2d at 1527.

- 27
- 28

D.

<u>Historical incidents from decades ago are irrelevant and a scandalous attempt</u> <u>to invoke guilt by association.</u>

3

Plaintiffs, in an attempt to tar present administrators (and, for that matter, students)
with alleged anti-Semitism of the past, devote *pages* to allegations of discrimination (or simply
free speech activities they find offensive) in the 1990s and early 2000s. (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 46-48, 5053, 55-59, 119, 121-22.) These alleged incidents are paraded before the Court as horribles *in se*,
but without any attempt to tie them to present-day administrators, present conditions on campus,
or *any actual harm to these Plaintiffs*.

Similarly, the academic politics of a debate over the funding and status of the
Jewish Studies Department or a donation to the university (*id.* at ¶¶ 54, 114-15) has *no connection to the Plaintiffs*. There are no allegations that Plaintiffs attempted to take Jewish Studies classes
and were denied the opportunity, and the Complaint suggests that the department is in fact
thriving. *Id.* Whatever faculty members may have felt about being asked to attend a meeting with
a donor, none of those faculty members is a plaintiff here.

15 "Superfluous historical allegations are a proper subject of a motion to strike."
16 *Fantasy, Inc*, 984 F.2d at 1527. Plaintiffs' superfluous history and faculty lounge gossip should be
17 stricken.

18

E.

The State Department definition of anti-Semitism is irrelevant.

19 Plaintiffs devote nearly a full page to a "working definition of anti-Semitism" "adopted" by the U.S. State Department. (Compl. ¶42.) The State Department, of course, is not 20 21 charged with enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d), on university campuses, and naturally any definition of anti-Semitism it creates will not be tailored to that end. 22 23 The State Department definition does *not* apply to college campuses under Title VI, as evidenced 24 by the fact that Congress recently debated (but has not passed) a bill that would incorporate the 25 State Department definition into Title VI. See H.R.6421, Anti-Semitism Awareness Act of 2016, 26 available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/6421/text. Kenneth Stern, 27 the lead author of the definition and a longtime crusader against anti-Semitism, has explicitly 28 stated in a letter to Congress that "[t]he definition was never intended to be used to limit speech on 1 a college campus; it was written for European data collectors to have a guideline for what to 2 include and what to exclude in reports." Kenneth Stern, Letter to Members of Congress (Dec. 6, 3 2016), available at http://jkrfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Letter-to-members-of-4 congress.pdf. The State Department definition is irrelevant, confuses the issues as to the standard under Title VI, and should be stricken. 5

6

F. Allegations about anti-Semitic campus speech are irrelevant.

7 Plaintiffs devote numerous pages to detailing alleged anti-Semitic statements made 8 on the SFSU campus. (*E.g.*, Compl. ¶ 119 and subparagraphs.) They suggest that these 9 "examples are noteworthy to demonstrate the rabidly anti-Semitic speech and conduct that is 10 supported on campus, as compared with the assault on the free speech rights of Plaintiffs and other 11 Jews." (Id.) But that comparison is logically inapposite, in terms of either free speech, equal 12 protection or Title VI doctrine. As to free speech, the question is whether *Plaintiffs' speech* was 13 unduly restricted, regardless of their Jewishness, and under circumstances similar to those in which others were allowed to speak freely. Plaintiffs' examples do not address this question. 14 15 They do not allege, for example, that Khalid Muhammad, Malik Ali, Omar Barghouti or Bassem Tamimi were better-protected against disruptive protesters than Mayor Barkat. 16

17 As to equal protection or Title VI, it does not matter what other *viewpoints* are 18 expressed on campus; the question is whether members of other *ethnicities and religions* are 19 afforded greater speech opportunities than Jewish students. A comparison between the expression of allegedly anti-Semitic viewpoints on the one hand and the speech of "Plaintiffs and other Jews" 20 21 on the other mixes apples and oranges.

22 Finally, these allegations are immaterial and impertinent to any sort of hostile 23 environment claim under Title VI. As noted above, most of these incidents occurred years ago. 24 (See Part IV.D., supra.) They are therefore irrelevant to whether there is currently a hostile 25 environment on campus. And Omar Barghouti and Bassem Tamimi—alleged to have spoken on 26 campus in 2009 and 2015, respectively—are not actually alleged to have made any anti-Semitic 27 remarks during their talks or in any other capacity on campus. (Compl. ¶ 119.) Rather, the sole 28 allegations about them concern their off-campus activities (and, in the case of Tamimi, acts by his

family members). All of this is utterly irrelevant to the question whether Defendants have created 1 or tolerated a pervasively hostile environment on campus.¹ 2

3 Because allegations of supposedly anti-Semitic speech by campus speakers are 4 analytically irrelevant to Plaintiffs' claims, they should be stricken from the complaint as 5 immaterial and impertinent.

6

G. Allegations of threats against Israeli soldiers are irrelevant.

7 The Complaint devotes four full pages to one student's alleged statements 8 regarding wanting to hurt or kill Israeli soldiers. (Compl. ¶ 97, 129-32.) But Plaintiffs are not 9 Israeli soldiers and do not live in Israel. The Complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs were 10 personally harmed, or even frightened, by these threats. These allegations can therefore have no relationship to Plaintiffs' claims—including the Title VI claim, which, as discussed in more detail 11 12 in the Motion to Dismiss, requires Plaintiffs to allege that the complained-of acts "deprived 13 Plaintiffs of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school." Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 410 (5th Cir. 2015) (brackets omitted). These allegations 14 are therefore not related to any claim and should be stricken from the Complaint. 15

- 16 17
- H.
- The characterization of Defendant Wong's statement as invoking anti-Semitic stereotypes is unsupported on its face and deliberately scandalous.

18 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Wong stated that Jewish students, like other 19 students, should go through normal institutional channels (i.e., address initial complaints to lower 20 level officials), and that he believed that the students were taking up too much of his time and had 21 too much access to his office. (Compl. \P 112.) Even if true, such statements are, on their face, the innocuous complaints of an overburdened school official. Yet Plaintiffs characterize this normal 22 23 and reasonable request as "invoking an anti-Semitic trope of Jewish power," a "reference to Jews" 24 disproportional power," and "a well-established anti-Semitic stereotype, attributable directly to the 25 ... 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion,'" an infamous anti-Semitic tract. (Id.; and see Compl. ¶ 48

26

¹ Additionally, for the reasons discussed in more depth in the Motion to Dismiss filed herewith, 27 these factual allegations cannot support a hostile environment claim under Title VI because the university lacked the authority to restrict these speakers' political speech, which is protected by 28 the First Amendment, on the grounds that it is allegedly anti-Semitic. (See MTD, Parts IV.E.2-3.)

(noting the use of the 'Protocols' as Nazi propaganda).) These assertions are so far from plausible 1 2 that they serve no legitimate purpose and bear no relationship to any claim; their sole purpose here 3 is to embarrass, harass, and silence President Wong and to provide fodder for press clippings. "[C]ourts have refused to permit their files to serve as reservoirs of libelous 4 5 statements for press consumption." Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). 6 "The federal courts do not provide a forum for mudslinging, name calling and 'privileged' 7 defamation." Micromed Tech., Inc. v. Birdsall, No. CIV 13-586-TUC-CKJ, 2014 WL 129049, at 8 *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 2014). To this end, "Rule 12(f) protects parties from the improper use of 9 judicial filings to broadcast scandalous or defamatory material." Doe v. W. Am. Province of Capuchin Franciscan Friars, No. 2:14-CV-01428-HZ, 2015 WL 5522016, at *6 (D. Or. Sept. 17, 10 2015). "[I]f the complaint or other pleadings are abusive or contain offensive language, they may 11 be stricken . . . under the inherent powers of the court." Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 12 13 425 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2005). 14 Numerous cases have stricken obviously groundless accusations in pleadings and other filings. In Pigford v. Veneman, 215 F.R.D. 2 (D.D.C. 2003), the plaintiffs' counsel, with "no 15 16 factual basis," accused defense counsel of "contempt for 'lawyers of color" as well as of "exhibit[ing] . . . [a] racist attitude." *Id.* at 3-4. The court held that 17 18 Chestnut, Sanders' charges of racism are plainly scandalous within the meaning of the Rule, in that they "improperly cast[] a derogatory light" on a dedicated 19 The accusations are indefensible and wholly government attorney inappropriate and have no place in filings in this court. 20 Because the accusations of racism in the Chestnut, Sanders filings are

- 21
 22
 23
 24
 25
 26
 27
 28
 29
 20
 20
 21
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25
 26
 27
 28
 29
 20
 20
 21
 21
 21
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25
 26
 27
 28
 29
 20
 20
 21
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25
 26
 27
 28
 29
 29
 20
 20
 21
 21
 21
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25
 26
 27
 28
 29
 29
 20
 20
 21
 21
 21
 22
 21
 22
 21
 22
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25
 26
 27
 27
 28
 29
 29
 20
 20
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 22
 21
 21
 21
 22
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 21
 2
- $23 \parallel Id.$ at *4-5 (emphasis added).

As in *Pigford*, the accusation against President Wong is unsupported and

25 unsupportable on its face. The allegation that President Wong "nodded" when someone else

26 stated that "Zionist power' and 'Jewish power' allusions were categorically anti-Semitic" does

- 27 not support the "anti-Semitic" allegation about him, since there is no allegation that President
- 28 Wong made any similar allusion to "Zionist power" or "Jewish power." His complaint, as alleged

-10-

DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF MOT. AND MOT. TO STRIKE

Case 3:17-cv-03511-WHO Document 41 Filed 08/21/17 Page 16 of 20

by Plaintiffs themselves, was directed toward specific students who had circumvented the
 university's established channels, not "Jews" or "Jewish power" or anything else like it. The
 accusation is hollow.

Similarly, in *Alvarado-Morales v. Digital Equip. Corp.*, the use of such terms as
"concentration camp," "brainwash" and "torture"—"repugnant words replete with tragic historical
connotations"—to describe a voluntary retirement program was held to have "no place in
pleadings before the court." 843 F.2d 613, 618 (1st Cir. 1988). Here, too, Plaintiffs grotesquely
invoke the historical horrors of the Holocaust to describe an official's asking them to direct their
inquiries to someone else.²

Plaintiffs unnecessarily couch this portion of their Complaint in "repulsive
language that detracts from the dignity of the court" in order to "cast a cruelly derogatory light on
a[nother] party." *Quatela*, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1050. The entire passage should be stricken from
the Complaint.

14

I. <u>Allegations regarding Defendant Abdulhadi</u>

Plaintiffs devote nearly two pages to complaining about Defendant Abdulhadi's³
allegedly meeting with, in their words, "terrorists," and an alleged "political litmus test" in her
classes. (Compl. ¶¶ 133-36.) Plaintiffs also allege that Professor Abdulhadi "effectively
conscripted Ethnic Studies students . . . to demand increased funding for [the Ethnic Studies
department] by staging a hunger strike." (*Id.* at ¶ 122.) None of these events or practices is tied to
any of the claims Plaintiffs asserts.

21Even assuming Plaintiffs' allegations are true, not one of them supports a First22Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, or Title VI claim against Professor Abdulhadi. Her

23

²⁴Other courts have stricken such plainly meritless, distracting, and harassing accusations as
²⁴"scandalous matter" under Rule 12(f). *See, e.g., Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co.*, 961 F.2d
²⁵"devoid of any factual basis"); *In re Johnson*, 236 B.R. 510, 523 (D.D.C. 1999) ("[T]]he

allegations of the Trustee being a 'liar' are so devoid of the necessary evidence to sustain them that they amount to little more than name-calling.").

²⁷
³ Moving Defendants' counsel do not represent Professor Abdulhadi, but Defendants move to
³ strike these allegations because Plaintiffs' apparently purport to sue her in her official capacity as an employee of the University.

Case 3:17-cv-03511-WHO Document 41 Filed 08/21/17 Page 17 of 20

meetings and any hunger strike she may have engaged in are protected speech and associational 1 2 activities and in any event are not alleged to have caused Plaintiffs any harm. The allegation that 3 she organized a hunger strike to raise money for her department does not suggest a diminishment of Plaintiffs' speech, assembly, or association rights. Nor would such an act create an 4 5 environment of racial or religious hostility that could support a Title VI claim. Even if it were true that Professor Abdulhadi requires a *political* litmus test regarding Israel or Zionism in her class, 6 7 this would also not support a claim of discrimination under Title VI, since Zionism is not a 8 defining trait of either racial Jewishness or religious Judaism, and many Jews do not subscribe to 9 Zionism.⁴ There is also no allegation that any Plaintiff took a class from Professor Abdulhadi or even wanted to do so. Plaintiffs simply do not allege that Professor Abdulhadi harmed them in 10 any way. These allegations are therefore immaterial and impertinent. 11

12 The allegations are immaterial for the further reason that Plaintiffs do not even 13 purport to assert any actual cause of action against Professor Abdulhadi. She is not named as a 14 defendant for any cause of action except a request for declaratory judgment (which sweeps in "all 15 Defendants"), the substance of which merely echoes the five other causes of action in which she is 16 *not* named. In effect, there is simply no claim against her to which any of the above-mentioned 17 allegations could bear any material relationship.

18Because they are not relevant to any cause of action, the allegations regarding19Professor Abdulhadi's "meeting with terrorists" should also be stricken as scandalous. As with20the assertions about President Wong noted above, they are an obvious attempt to draw headlines21and smear Professor Abdulhadi's name, without any utility in resolving the claims in this action.22The inflammatory term "terrorist" is routinely applied in a highly political and racially charged23manner to demonize brown, black, and Muslim people.⁵ The attempt to associate Professor

24

²⁵ ⁴ See, e.g., Debra Nussbaum Cohen, Anti-Zionist Hasidic Jews Shake the Room at Brooklyn's

Barclays Center, Haaretz (Jun 12, 2017), http://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-1.795270
(last accessed Aug. 18, 2017) (quoting a Hasidic Jew: "We feel very strongly that there should not be and could not be a State of Israel before the Messiah comes ").

28 ⁵ See, e.g., Josh Terry, Let's laugh at this blogger who called Beyoncé an 'urban terrorist', Chicago Tribune (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/redeye/redeye-beyonce-

DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF MOT. AND MOT. TO STRIKE

Abdulhadi with violence by alleging that she met with Leila Khaled is analogous to scurrilous
 attempts to paint Barack Obama as "pallin' around with terrorists" because of his association with
 1960s radical William Ayers.⁶ These allegations should be stricken as scandalous.

4

J. <u>Mr. Stuart, Mr. Piccinotti, and Ms. Harris as Defendants</u>

5 Plaintiffs do purport to name Defendants Brian Stuart, Vernon Piccinotti, and Shimina Harris as defendants in their substantive claims. Stuart and Harris are named as 6 7 defendants in the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action, while Piccinotti is named as to the 8 Third Cause of Action. (Compl. at 61:12-13, 63:7-8, 65:4-6.) The problem is that there are no 9 factual allegations that could conceivably support any claim for relief against any of them. 10 The allegations regarding Mr. Stuart (apart from his employment status) are as follows: he *received* an email on March 30, 2016 regarding Hillel reserving a room (Compl. ¶ 63); 11 he *received* an email notifying him that there was a potentially controversial speaker at a student 12 13 event (Compl. ¶ 65); in an investigative narrative, he noted several possible student code 14 violations by students (Compl. \P 80); and he wrote an email to a student protestor offering security support. (Compl. ¶ 122.) 15 16 The sole factual allegation as to Mr. Piccinotti (apart from his employment status) 17 is that he *received* an email on March 30, 2016 regarding Hillel reserving a room. (Compl. ¶ 63.) 18 There are no factual allegations at all as to Harris. 19 There are literally no allegations that any of these Defendants took any action of any kind that harmed Plaintiffs. References to them as defendants in the individual causes of 20 action should be stricken as immaterial to those causes of action. 21 22 lemonade-drudge-role-model-urban-terrorist-20160425-story.html; Amanda Terkel, Donald 23 Trump Floats Conspiracy Theory That Huma Abedin Has Terrorist Ties, Huffington Post (Aug. 24 29, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-humaabedin_us_57c4aaafe4b09cd22d92273c. Cf. Janell Ross, Why aren't we calling the Oregon 25 occupiers 'terrorists'?, Washington Post (Jan. 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/01/03/why-arent-we-calling-the-oregon-26 militia-terrorists/?utm term=.3a6c94bcbf7f. (All links last accessed Aug. 18, 2017.) 27 ⁶ See Fact Check: Is Obama 'palling around with terrorists'?, CNN.com (Oct. 5, 2008), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2008/10/05/fact-check-is-obama-palling-around-with-28 terrorists/. (Last accessed Aug. 18, 2017.) CASE NO. 3:17-CV-03511-WHO -13-DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF MOT. AND MOT. TO STRIKE

K.

<u>In the alternative, Defendants move for a more definite statement as to</u> <u>Defendants Abdulhadi, Stuart, Piccinotti, and Harris</u>

In the alternative, Defendants respectfully request that the Court order Plaintiffs to
make a more definite statement as to exactly how any unlawful conduct by Defendants Abdulhadi,
Stuart, Piccinotti, or Harris has harmed them. "A party may move for a more definite statement
of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that
the party cannot reasonably prepare a response." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). As the Complaint stands,
these four Defendants cannot determine what, if any, actions they are alleged to have taken that
form the basis of Plaintiffs' claims and so cannot reasonably answer those claims.

If Plaintiffs do not or cannot provide a more definite statement, the Court has the
authority to strike the allegations and the claims against these Defendants. *Id.*

12

V. <u>CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF</u>

Because the Complaint is "saturated with redundant, immaterial, impertinent, and
scandalous matter," striking just portions of it may prove "virtually impossible." *Conklin*, 2011
WL 1303299, at *2. Defendants therefore respectfully request that the Court strike the Complaint
in its entirety.

17 In the alternative, and at a minimum, Defendants respectfully request that the Court18 strike the following portions of the Complaint:

- The redundant "Summary of the Action" section (Compl. ¶¶ 1-16.)
 Immaterial and impertinent references to events from the 1990s and 2000s especially the mere recounting of irrelevant protected speech under circumstances not comparable to the complained-of events. (Compl. ¶¶ 46-48, 50-53, 55-59, 119, 121-22.)
 Immaterial, impertinent, and conclusory assertions of violations of student codes and state criminal laws. (Compl. ¶¶ 79-80.)
- Immaterial and impertinent allegations regarding the funding or status of the Jewish
 Studies department. (Compl. ¶¶ 54, 114-15.)
- 28

¹ 2

	Case 3:17-cv-03511-WHO Doc	cument 41 Filed 08/21/17 Page 20 of 20	
1 2	• Immaterial and impert ¶ 42.)	inent State Department definition of anti-Semitism. (Compl.	
3		inent references to alleged threats against Israeli soldiers.	
4	(Compl. ¶¶ 97, 129-32		
5		nt, and scandalous references to Defendant Wong's statement	
6	-	that Jewish students should go through proper university channels. (Compl. ¶¶	
7	112-13.)		
8	• Immaterial, irrelevant,	and scandalous references to Defendant Abdulhadi's	
9	"meeting with terroris	ts." (Compl. ¶¶ 133-36.)	
10	• Immaterial and impert	inent references to Defendant Abdulhadi's allegedly	
11	organizing a hunger strike. (Compl. at $\P\P$ 80, 122.)		
12	All references to Defe	ndants Abdulhadi, Stuart, Piccinotti, and Harris as	
13	defendants. (Compl. a	defendants. (Compl. at 61:12-13, 63:7-8, 65:4-6, 70: 21-22.) In the alternative,	
14	Defendants move for a	Defendants move for a more definite statement of the claims against these four	
15	purported defendants.		
16	DATED: August 21, 2017	Respectfully submitted,	
17		MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP BRADLEY S. PHILLIPS	
18		ADELE M. EL-KHOURI SETH J. FORTIN	
19		By: /s/ Bradley S. Phillips	
20		BRADLEY S. PHILLIPS	
21		Attorneys for Defendants BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE	
22		CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY;	
23		LESLIE WONG; MARY ANN BEGLEY; LUOLUO HONG; LAWRENCE BIRELLO;	
24 25		REGINALD PARSON; OSVALDO DEL VALLE; KENNETH MONTEIRO; BRIAN	
23 26		STUART; ROBERT NAVA; MARK JARAMILLA; VERNON PICCINOTTI; AND SHIMINA HARRIS	
20		σι μνιμνά πάκκισ	
27			
	DEFENDANTS	-15- CASE NO. 3:17-CV-03511-WHO ' NOTICE OF MOT. AND MOT. TO STRIKE	